In the corridors of the headquarters of the Israeli military intelligence service (Aman) in Tel Aviv, the question was not if its boss, Major General Aharon Haliva, was going to resign but when.. The monumental failure to prevent the largest terrorist attack in Israel's history left him no choice.. It is the chronicle of an announced resignation that will not be the last following October 7.
Like other senior army officers, starting with the chief of the General Staff, Herzi Halevi, and the heads of the rest of the security agencies, Haliva assumed responsibility shortly after the Hamas attack.. He did not resign then as his country embarked on the massive military response against the Islamist group in the Gaza Strip.. The seven open fronts in the region, including in the last two weeks the possibility of a direct war with Iran, complete a challenging picture for the Intelligence services, be it Amman, Shabak (internal security) or Mossad (foreign espionage).. On the other hand, Haliva's resignation announcement confirms that the offensive in Gaza moved to a much more limited phase at the expense of the ground incursion in Rafah.
“On Saturday, October 7, 2023, Hamas carried out a murderous surprise attack against the State of Israel with painful and harsh results.. The Intelligence division under my command was not up to the task that had been entrusted to us,” says the first senior official to resign after 7-O. The news marked the news of the day in Israel by eclipsing, for example, the attack in Jerusalem in which two Palestinians ran over and slightly injured three Israelis but were unable to kill them when their weapon jammed.. Hours later they were arrested.
Hamas launches its largest attack by land, air and sea from Gaza and Israel declares a state of war
How is it possible that Israel did not see the Hamas attack coming?
Haliva's resignation letter revolves around the first Saturday of last October. 50 years after Haman's failure to foresee the attack by Egypt and Syria that gave rise to war, another much more serious one arrived.
“I will always carry with me that black day. Day after day and night after night. I will always carry with me the terrible pain of war,” he admits, referring to the murder of 1,200 people and the kidnapping of another 250 in the Hamas attack.. His announcement coincided with the beginning of the Jewish Passover holiday, which symbolizes freedom, raising anguish in Israel over the 133 kidnapped people still in captivity (a significant part of them are dead).. His freedom was further removed in recent days after the failure of negotiations for a six-week ceasefire and the exchange of hundreds of prisoners for dozens of hostages.
“The authority [of the position] is linked to a great responsibility for the mission, the people, the success and the failure,” adds Haliva in words that the head of the opposition, Yair Lapid, was quick to cite to demand the resignation. from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The leader is the only one in the military and political leadership who has not yet publicly assumed and made explicit the responsibilities for the 7-0.
While many applaud Haliva's decision to accept her mistakes and leave office, Dror Ashram, which lost its 19-year-old daughter Shai in the jihadist attack on the Nahal Oz base, demands that she not only go home but to the jail. “This man should not only resign but be judged because he failed, as he himself admits. I think the judges will come to the conclusion that it is his fault in the first place and that is why he should go to jail. He must pay for what he did,” he cries.
“When my daughter was murdered, this man was sleeping,” she denounces in an interview on the Israeli state radio station in which she points out to everyone: “From the first to the last, everyone must go home. “From the base intelligence officer to the prime minister, everyone has failed and must go home.”
Haliva, who is leaving the Army after 38 years, considers it necessary “to create a state investigative commission that can exhaustively, in-depth and accurately investigate and determine all the factors and circumstances that led to these difficult events.”
On the night before the Hamas attack, Haliva was on vacation in Eilat. There he was informed of some signals received about something that was happening on the border, without ruling out the possibility of a limited attack by the Islamists.. It was estimated that the signals were not strong and extraordinary enough to put the army on alert in the Gaza Strip.. In a conversation that morning, the main senior leaders agreed to hold consultations again first thing in the morning. At 6:29, however, Hamas began the attack.
The failure of Israeli Intelligence was not to give the importance deserved by these signals, the previous warnings from lower-ranking soldiers, militia groups hours before or the military training of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad days before near the border with exercises simulating infiltrations. .
But, above all, the officers and leaders relied too much on the paradigm according to which Hamas was not interested in starting the war from the area under control, among other reasons because of the economic measures encouraged by Israel (entry of 20,000 Gazan workers , Qatari aid, etc.).
Another major mistake by Military Intelligence under Haliva's command was not foreseeing that Iran would respond with an unprecedented direct attack (around 350 missiles and drones) before the Israeli Air Force killed seven Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers last week. April 1 in Damascus.