The fight against corruption in modern societies requires behaviors in addition to those of a pure regulatory framework in the penal or administrative sanctioning field.

To put it more clearly: the criminal reproach and, therefore, the administrative one have become insufficient to achieve a fight against pathological behaviors in the field of public corruption, first, and corruption between individuals, a posteriori.

The insufficiency derives from a host of factors ranging from the sophistication of the offender in the formulation of the crime to the ability to operate in countries where there are no conventional judicial relationships or where legal relationships are established in an unconventional manner..

This has led to a reduction in the degree of effectiveness of the police and judicial systems, no matter how much progress has been made in the regulations that regulate both areas..

From the verification of this reality, the eyes of the world, especially the Anglo-Saxon and the European Union itself, turned towards individuals. It was suggested that the effectiveness of this fight would only progress from citizen collaboration.

This consideration has forced, in turn, to reformulate the legal techniques for the protection of people who collaborate in the discovery of conducts that find a criminal or administrative classification..

In this context, as we say, the collaboration of the complainant is sought. The first technique that is imported from the field of competition is the one related to the reduction of the degree of responsibility and the sanction of the collaborating whistleblower.

The denunciation of the collaborator passes to our legislation and today is contemplated in the procedural norms of a common nature.

It is true, however, that the spectrum of collaboration could be broader than that referring to the one who has participated in the events and seeks their exculpation. Society as a whole has or can have a relevant role in this collaboration.

This is where the so-called complaint channels arise.. European legislation dedicated, initially, a series of efforts to encourage -more or less euphemistically speaking- the creation and management of channels.

But it is quickly observed that some elements of effectiveness suffer if the identity of the complainant can be known and, therefore, the possibilities of increasing the number are limited, especially if elements of coercion or retaliation begin to be appreciated.

This has led the Spanish legislator to issue Law 2/2023, of February 20, regulating the protection of people who report on regulatory violations and the fight against corruption. This law incorporates into Spanish Law Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of October 23, 2019.

Now the approach is broader as established in Article 1 of the same when it states that (the) “… purpose of granting adequate protection against reprisals that may be suffered by natural persons who report any of the actions or omissions to which referred to in article 2, through the procedures set forth therein…”.

Determination that is specified with the indication of the provisions in section 2 when it indicates that “… Its purpose is also to strengthen the culture of information, of the integrity infrastructures of organizations and the promotion of the culture of information or Communication as a mechanism to prevent and detect threats to the public interest…”.

It is true that the norm has a broader content than the simple protection. In this sense, the creation of an independent authority that must solve complaints of retaliation stands out, but also that can become an external channel that, with the guarantees of the public sphere, is the instrument for processing the complaints themselves.

This model of strong public commitment to the creation of an independent body and the linking of public resources to the denunciation system has created a relational framework with substantive administrative procedures (in which corruption may have occurred or in which the determination of responsibility against it) and, eventually, in the criminal field when the conducts in question affect this area of reproach.

This relational scope transcends the central objective of whistleblower protection to be inserted in the creation of a specific organization at the service of the fight against corruption.

The most obvious proof is that the Autonomous Community of Catalonia attributes, on an organic level, this competence to the Anti-Fraud Office.

This demonstrates that the relational sphere, beyond the protection of the whistleblower, is yet to be built and delimited.

This will be the work of the coming years and the effectiveness of the measures contemplated in the new regulation will depend, to a large extent, on its final operation.